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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
H. M. GRIBBLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. No. 6224 
MRS. EMMA COWLEY, 
Defendant an~d Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
The plaintiff has appealed this action relying upon 
two assignments of errors, namely, 1. That the evidence 
is insufficient to justify the verdict in the particulars as 
set forth in detail therein, and 2. Misconduct of the jury 
in the particulars as set forth in detail therein. 
Under these assignments of errors the appellant has 
submitted a lengthy argument contending that the court 
erred in denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial 
in this action. 
POINT "A" 
Under point A as argued by the appellant the fact is 
not disputed by defendant that if contributory negli-
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gence is relied on that it must be plead, but in this action 
the defendant did not rely on contributory negligence 
as a defense. To the complaint filed by the plaintiff 
charging the defendant with negligence causing the death 
of William Hale Gribble, this defendant entered an an-
swer denying any negligence on her part for the injury 
and death of the said William Hale Gribble. 
The material allegations of the plaintiff's complaint 
in this action were in substance: That Mrs. Cowley, the 
defendant, was operating an automobile in a northerly 
direction upon the public highway at about the hour of 
3:15P.M. on the 13th day of December, 1937, at a point 
within Gunnison City on which is known as the San Pitch 
Bridge, that she was driving said automobile carelessly 
and negligently in the following manner: That she was 
going in excess of 40 miles per hour; that she carelessly 
and negligently failed to keep a careful or any lookout 
for persons along and upon said highway; that she failed 
to have said automobile under her control and negligent-
ly and carelessly drove and operated .said automobile to 
the extreme east edge of the paved portion of said bridge 
and failed to operate said automobile with sufficient 
clearance to the left of the deceased, and failed to give 
any signal whatsoever of her intention to pass said de-
ceased upon his left ; that the deceased, was then and 
there travelling on a bicycle in a northerly direction along 
and upon the east portion of the said highway crossing 
the San Pitch Bridge approximately in the center and 
about one foot West of the East edge of the paved por-
tion of the Highway on the said bridge, and was then 
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and there exercising due care and caution for his own 
safety. That the defendant. by reason of her aforesaid 
negligence, caused said autonwbile to strike upon and 
against the bicycle of the deceased and his body which 
resulted in the injury from which he later died. 
The testimony of the defendant, relating to the court 
and the jury the detail of how this accident occurred 
(Ab. 35-38) and on cross examination (Ab. 39-50) did 
not disclose any neg·ligence on her part but was to the 
effect that she was travelling upon the highway, using 
due care, that she had her car under control, that she was 
travelling about 25 miles per hour as she approached the 
San Pitch Bridge, that she was keeping a careful lookout 
for persons along and upon the highway, and that this 
boy darted out on his bicycle and she sounded her horn 
as she approached to pass him turning her car over to 
the west side of the highway so as to pass him and that 
he turned his bicycle into her car and she whirled to 
avoid him but could not. 
Her testimony was not refuted. Nor was there any 
evidence introduced by the plaintiff which in any way 
proved any negligence on her part. 
Then there is the testimony of the defendant's wit-
ness, Mildred Mclff, an eye witness to the accident (A b. 
50-51) whose testimony was to the effect that she saw 
the boy on his bicycle, saw the car approach, and saw the 
boy turn his bicycle into the car. 
This undisputed evidence that the deceased turned 
his bicycle into the defendant's car went into the record 
without objection by the plaintiff. And it is this evidence 
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that plaintiff is stressing as being evidence of contribu-
tory negligence and therefore being improper evidence 
for the jury to consider .. But plaintiff alleged as a mate-
rial allegation in his complaint that the deceased was 
travelling upon his bicycle upon said highway exercising 
due care and caution for his own safety, which allegation 
was denied by the defendant in her answer, and cer-
tainly any evidence which would tend to disprove the 
plaintiff's material allegations was certainly admissible 
under the pleadings. 
Under defendant's answer of denial, which specifi-
cally denied each and all of the plaintiff's allegations of 
negligence set up in his complaint, defendant contends 
that she had the right to introduce evidence that would 
defeat the plaintiff's claims. 
Bancroft Code Pleading, Volume 4, page 3550, Sec. 
2046, states : 
''Answer generally-In an action based upon 
negligence the defendant may, of course, plead any 
defense which he has, even though they be not whol-
ly consistent, as in case of a denial of negligence and 
an allegation of contributory negligence, subject to 
the general limitations elsewhere discussed. Mat-
ters of affirmative defense must be specially pleaded, 
such as an act of God, but this is not necessary with 
respect to matters which are covered by denials of 
the facts alleged. Thus a denial of any negligence on 
the part of the defendant warrants proof that the 
injury was solely due to the negligence of the plain-
tiff, without the necessity of a plea of contributory 
negligence. '' 
In support of this is the case of Hughes v. Warman 
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Steel Casting Company, a ease decided by the Supreme 
Court of the State of California reported in 163 Pacific, 
page 885, in which it was hel< 1 that defendant having in 
its ans\Yt>r denied all negligc>lh'e on its part, this plea, 
though denominated a special defense, is simply an af-
firmative charge of negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff which was available under the general issue without 
special ;plea, and the evidence respecting it would have 
to be considered with all the other evidence in the case in 
determining whether it justified a verdict for the plain-
tiff, which the jury, of course, did. 
See also Cargil v. Atwood, 18 R.I. 303, 27 Atl. 214, to 
the effect that the general issue puts plaintiff upon prov-
ing his whole case, and entitles defendant, without special 
notice, to give evidence of anything which shows that 
plaintiff ought not to recover. 
And in the case of Smith vs. Ogden & N. W. R. Co., 
33 Utah, 129; 93 Pac. 185, the case cited by appellant in 
his brief is directly in support of the defendant's conten-
tions in this case, to-wit: 
''That the plaintiff is required to allege and 
prove negligence on the part of the defendant, and 
that such negligence, as a natural and direct result, 
occasioned the injury.'' 
and further: 
"Under the general issue, the defendant may in-
troduce any evidence which tends to disprove the 
negligence charged against him, or which tends to 
disprove the casual connection of his negligence and 
the injury. '' 
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There was no testimony or evidence introduced in this 
case that brought out any negligence on the part of the 
defendant. While on the other hand there was evidence 
introduced which showed that the deceased turned his 
bicycle into the defendant's car, tending to show that the 
deceased was not using due care as plaintiff had alleged, 
and further tending to show the defendant's freedom from 
negligence in the matter. We contend that defendant had 
a right in proving her freedom from negligence to intro-
duce any evidence showing how the accident occurred, and 
such evidenceand testimony did go into the record with-
out objection by the plaintiff or his counsel. 
It is well settled as frequently stated by the courts 
that under a general denial in an answer that the de-
fendant may make any defense that vrill defeat plain-
tiff's claim. While on the other hand a person pleading 
contributory negligence thereby admits his own negli-
gence in the case and seeks to avoid responsibility by 
reason of the claim that the other party contributed to 
his own negligence. That, however, ~as not the case at 
all before the court. The evidence of the defense in this 
case all the way through, showed absolutely that the in-
jury and death of the boy in this case was purely acci-
dent as it were as far as the defendant is concerned. That 
was unavoidable and no responsibility could be placed 
upon the defendant by reason thereof. And this was the 
verdict reached by the jury in this case when they re-
turned a verdict in favor of the defendant of no cause 
of action. 
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POINT "B" 
Under point B, appellant has sub1nitted argument on 
the duty of the jury to follow the eourt 's instruction. We 
do not contend that it was not the duty of the jury to 
follow the court's instruction, and certainly the appellant 
has not presented any evidence to show that the jury in 
this action did not follow the instructions of the court. 
The Appellant has cited the case of Moulton vs. 
Staats, et al., reported in 83 Utah 197, 27 Pac. (2nd) 455. 
This is an action where the jury were instructed that if 
the issues were found against the plaintiff and in favor 
of defendant, that all the defendants would be entitled 
to was on their counterclaim in the sum of $886.50. And 
that if they found in favor of the plaintiff and against 
defendants, the defendants w:ould be entitled to a .set-off 
in the sum of $886.50. The jury returned their verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $2500.00. However, 
it was the intention of the jury to render a verdict for the 
defendant on their counterclaim of $886.50, same to be 
offset against the $2500.00, leaving a balance of $1614.00 
for plaintiff. And the Jury showed by affidavit that it 
was an oversight on their part to fail to find a verdict 
for the defendants on their counterclaim. 
There can be no dispute that in the case above cited 
there was an apparant disregard by the jury of the in-
struction given by the Court. But this case is not in point 
with the case at bar. There is no evidence here that the 
jury disregarded the instruction of the court. 
The testimony of the juror, Mr. Lowry, on Cross 
Examination (Tr. 142) was very definite that the jury 
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did follow the court's instructions, quoting from that tes-
timony: 
"Q. Mr. Lowry, did the jury follow and go over 
the court's instructions~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q!. And you arrived at your verdict from his 
instructions~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you accept the law as His Honor gave 
you1 
A. Yes, sir." 
The jury had the right to consider the evidence intro-
duced in determining whether Mrs. Cowley was negli-
gent, and if her negligence was the proximate cause of the 
injury, as instructed by the court. Although it is clear 
from the evidence that the question of William Hale 
Gribble's negligence in comparison with any negligence 
of the defendant was not the issue upon which the Jury 
o bta.ined their verdict, the evidence shows there was some 
discussion as to this. But the evidence also shows that 
the verdict was reached upon the question of whether or 
not the defendant was negligent, and the jury unanimous-
ly found that the defendant was not negligent, and, 
therefore, reached their verdict of no cause of action. 
POINT "C" 
On his point C, appellant contends that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant the motion for new trial, which 
contention respondent must earnestly reject. This motion 
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was made on two grounds, nan1ely, 1, Misconduct of the 
jury. :2. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the ver-
dict, and that the yerdict is ap:ni·1st the law. 
Affidavits of the mother of the deceased and her 
sister-in-law were filed in support of such motion, at-
tempting to show the alleg·ed Iniscondnrt of the jury in the 
jury room. At the hearing of this motion the following 
evidence ·was broug·ht before the court: 
In the first place we have the evidence of Mrs. Grib-
ble, the mother of the boy who was killed as stated in this 
action, saying that during· the deliberation of the jury she 
and her sister-in-law were on the sidewalk in front of 
the court house, the jury room being upstairs, and that 
she heard a discussion of voices from the jury room, but 
could not recognize the voices. She could not positively 
testify that it was even one of the jurors whose voice she 
heard but she claimed that the effect of the statement or 
statements was upon the question of the relative negli-
gence as beween Mr.s. Cowley and the boy who was killed 
in the accident. But that was all she claimed that she 
heard-nothing more. (Ab. 58-59.) 
Her sister-in-law, Mrs. Gladys Nielson claimed that 
.she heard practically the same thing but she could not say 
positively as to who made the statement or even whether 
it was a juryman or somebody else. (Ab. 59-60-61.) 
Now as an attempt to identify and bring to the court 
evidence as to such statements having been made in sub-
stance plaintiff called two of the jurors before the court 
in this case, namely, Mr. King and Mr. Lowry and ques-
tioned them upon a purported talk or discussion upon the 
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question of the relative negligence between the parties 
mentioned. One juror said there was a great deal of talk 
upon that, the other jun'r said there was a little conver-
sation upon that but there was no vote taken upon that 
matter, no determination whatever resulted upon that 
phase of their discussion. 
I quote from Mr. Lowry's testimony upon direct ex-
amination by Mr. Beatie (Ab. 62-63) : 
'' Q. I will ask you this then: Isn't it a fact that 
most of the time during the deliberations of the jury 
on that ,particular evening was the discussion as be-
tween the fact that William Hale Gribble was negli-
gent, and that Mrs. Cowley was also negligent, and 
that William Hale Gribble was more negligenU 
A. No, sir, that is not a fact. 
Q. What would you say that was~ 
A. The most of the discussion was as to whether 
Mrs. Cowley was negligent or not. 
Q. It iR a fact, however, there was a discussion 
as to the negligence of William Hale GribblP' 
A. A little discussion, but no ballots taken.'' 
If that constituted misconduct then under the law of 
this State it could not possibly and cannot possibly be 
received by the court in this action in support of the 
motion upon the positive and well attested law to the 
effect that a juryman will not be permitted to impeach 
his own verdict. 
It was held in the case of Metcalf v. Romano, decided 
by the Supreme Court of California, and reported in 257 
Pacific, Page 114, that expressions of individual juror 
10 
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during deliberations prior to arriving at verdict, in ac-
tion for death of seven year old boy struck by automo-
bile, held not sufficient reason for setting aside verdict 
for plaintiff and g-ranting new trial, as showing prejudice 
against defendant. FrOin that ease 1 quote: 
''The action of the trial court in refusing to grant 
a new trial on account of the alleged prejudice of 
one of the trial jurors must be upheld. It does not 
appear from the transcript or briefs how many of 
defendant's peremptory challenges were used, the 
record saying one or more was exercised. Whether 
or not the jury was polled on the rendering of the 
verdict does not appear. The motion was heard on 
the affidavits of two of the jurors and the attorney 
for defendants. If verdicts could be set aside be-
cause of the expressions of individual jurors during 
their deliberations prior to arriving at a verdict a 
procedure novel in the administration of justice 
would be introduced, for by a long line of decisions 
of the appellate courts of this and many other states 
it is held that verdicts cannot be impeached by the 
affidavit of jurors.'' 
In the case of Skeen v. Skeen, reported in 76 Utah, 
page 32, it was held that ordinarily, new trial is not 
granted for remarks in jurors' hearing, where neither 
successful party nor jurors were at fault, unless remarks 
probably influenced verdict. 
In the case of Mast v. Claxton, 290 Pacific 48, 107 
Cal. 59, it was held that to justify new trial for miscon-
duct of juror, it must be shown that prejudice resulted 
or that juror gave wilfully untruthful answer. 
It is only where the verdict of a jury cannot be justi-
11 
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fied, upon any hypothesis presented by the evidence that 
it should be set aside on the ground that it is a compro-
mise verdict. See Woolsey v. Ziegler, 123 Pacific 164; 
(Oklahoma Case). 
LaFargue v. United Railroads of San Francisco, a 
California case reported in 192 Pacific, page 538, where a 
juror was guilty of violating the instructions of the court 
in asking certain questions and making statements, upon 
which it was charged that he thus openly prejudiced the 
case and expressed his criticism to his fellow jurors. 
Upon this matter the District Court of Appeal in de-
ciding this case said: 
''We are willing to concede that the juror was 
guilty of a violation of the instruction of the court 
and of his duty as a juror in making the statements. 
But we cannot go with appellant's learned counsel 
to the extent of holding that the statements neces-
sarily showed a prejudiced mind. Neither can we 
concede that the incident could have ultimately af-
fected the minds of intelligent jurors, as we must 
assume the jurors who heard the statements to have 
been, to the prejudice of the defendant's cause. The 
whole matter was passed on by the trial court on mo-
tion for a new trial, and it was warranted in holding 
that the conclusions of the juror thus hastily reached 
and expressed, based as it was upon an absolutely 
irrelevant fact, could not have operated to affect the 
juror's mind in reaching a verdict.'' 
If that doctrine is applied which we believe will be 
applied in this case, then what do we have~ We have the 
testimony of Mr.s. Gribble and her sister-in-law that when 
they were on the sidewalk during the time that the jury 
12 
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was deliberating in their room they heard some voices 
which they could not tell or identify, to the effect that the 
boy Gribble was more negligent or equally negligent as 
they stated, with the defendaut, which certainly left at 
that stage cannot possibly be used by the court in sup-
port of the assignment on the ground of misconduct of a 
jury. It would be ridiculous, contrary to all precedent 
to allo·w and permit such flimsy testimony not identified 
as to the voices to be the basis of setting aside a verdict of 
a jury. 
Now as a matter of law, however, even if defendant 
should admit the statements and that said statements and 
arguments were made by the jury, then the question 
would be as to whether or not that w:as misconduct that 
prejudiced the minds of the jury. There was no issue 
raised in this case as to contributory negligence. There 
was a general denial of the acts of negligence as set forth 
in the complaint. There was no claim whatever in this 
case to the effect that Mrs. Cowley was negligent but a 
direct denial of any acts of negligence in this rna tter and 
under that general denial the defense had a right abso-
lutely to show to the jury just how the unfortunate ac-
cident happened and in that evidence there was brought 
forth an eye witness to the affair that absolutely showed 
that by reason of the fact that the decedent swung his 
bicycle into the automobile of Mrs. Cowley that the acci-
dent was absolutely unavoidable as far as the defendant 
was concerned. That immediately after the accident she 
stopped the car within a very short distance showing 
that she had complete control of the car and turned 
13 
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around and came back to the scene of the accident. Sure-
ly in view of this and all of the evidence in the case the 
jury certainly would ha·ve a right to deliberate and talk 
about the evidence in the matter and in view of the fact 
that the defendant in this case proved to the satisfaction 
of the jury that she was innocent of negligence in this 
matter and further that the accident did not happen by 
reason of any error or negligent act of hers but was 
absolutely caused by the person who was victim of the 
sad affair. 
If we were to follow the theory of the plaintiff in this 
case defendant would not have been permitted even to 
show how this accident haprpened. Now, again we take up 
the matter to the effect that contributory negligence was 
not an issue in the case. Consequently the mere fact that 
there may have been sonie deliberation or talk hy the 
jurors in this case as to the question of contributory neg-
ligence or the relative negligence as between the defend-
ant and the decedent that would absolutely be immaterial 
under the law when as a matter of fact there is no evi-
dence whatever to show that the mind of any juror was 
prejudiced thereby or that it resulted in or entered into 
the decision or verdict of the jury in this case. 
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 5, Sec. 1780, page 
1173, upon the question of misconduct of jurors this doc-
trine is laid down : 
''Misconduct of the jury or a juror may, like 
error in practically any other particular, be either 
rna terial and harmful, or immaterial and harmless. 
Which it is to be determined on an examination by 
the appellate court of the entire record. 
14 
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In order to authorize the setting aside of a ver-
dict on account of n1isconduct, it must appear that 
such misconduct tended to result in a substantial in-
jury to the party complaining. Although jealous to 
preserve the integTity of verdicts, the courts are not 
on the alert for pretext to .set them aside and will 
not scrutinize the subjective n1ental processes of the 
jurors to ferret out prejudice from misconduct where 
none is apparent. Intermediate improprieties in the 
course of deliberation or discussion which obviously 
do not continue into or have any effect on the ver-
dict finally reached are harn1less; and on its ap-
pearing affirmatively that no juror was influenced 
by the improper conduct, no significance will be at-
tached to such conduct by the reviewing court. Mere 
.speculation, in the course of discussion, as to what 
a witness whose testimony was excluded would have 
testified to had it been admitted will not be deemed 
prejudicial. ' ' 
Referring to the question of what a juror may testify 
to after the decision in any matter, the appellant has 
cited the case of Ogden L. & I. Ry. Co. vs. Jones, et al., 
51 Utah 62 ; 168 Pac. 548. In this case the alleged mis-
conduct of a juror during the deliberations of the jury 
was attempted to be proved by the affidavit of the ap-
pellant and his counsel, in which it was shown that the 
juror admitted certain facts respecting his conduct, show-
ing that the juror entertained strong bias or prejudice 
against appellant and his witnesses, and in view of that 
was disqualified to sit as a juror in the case. 
Chief Justice Frick at page 70 of the Utah Report, 
say.s, as quoted by the appellant in the case at bar: 
"If a juror is actually guilty of misconduct, one 
or more of the other jurors may testify to the facts 
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constituting the alleged misconduct, or the same may 
be proved by any witness who observed and knows 
the facts. '' 
But the appellant did not quote the further statement of 
Justice Frick, to-wit: 
"It is well settled, however, that the alleged mis-
conduct of a juror may not be established by merely 
proving his declarations.'' 
And quoting further from the same case, Chief Justice 
Frick says: 
"It is elementary that a juror may not be heard 
to impeach his own verdict. If that were permitted, 
one, or perhaps more, of the jurors could be found 
in every case who, for the sake of appeasing the 
wrath or soothing the feelings of the losing party, 
would disclose .something for which it could be 
claimed the verdict should be set aside. Indeed, a 
juror, or even a number of them, might agree to a 
verdict with that end in view. The law, therefore, 
wisely provides that a juror may not disclose facts 
which would go in impeachment of his verdict; and 
what a juror may not do directly may not be done 
indirectly by proving the declarations of a juror." 
And the court in this particular case found that the evi-
dence contained in the affidavits, was not admissible 
upon sound public policy. 
In fact, the case of Black vs. Rocky Mountain Bell Tel. 
Co., reported in 26 Utah 451, 73 Pac. page 514, it was 
decided that "Under Rev. St. 1898, 3292, subd. 2, pro-
viding that, when any one or more of the jurors, has been 
induced to assent to a verdict by resorting to the de-
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termination of chance, such misconduct may be proved 
by the affidaYit of any one of thP jurors, 1nisconduct other 
than that specified cannot be e8tablished on a motion for 
a new trial by the juror's affidavit." 
Revised Statutes of Utah 1~98, 3~9:2 subd. 2, is sub-
stantially the same as ReYised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
104-40-2, subd. ~. Under the ruling of this case it would 
seem well established that misconduct other than that 
where it appears that one or more of the jurors has been 
induced to assent to a verdict by resorting to chance, 
cannot be introduced by affidavit of a juror, and likewise 
the same rule would apply to the testimony of a juror. 
The case of Hamilton Y. Snyder, 18~ \Vash. 688, 48 
Pac. (2nd) 245, which the appellant has cited, was a case 
where on affidavit of some of the jurors it was shown the 
jury took an informal ballot, resulting in 11 for defendant 
and 1 for plaintiff. Following this the jury requested 
that the court's instructions be read and a formal ballot 
taken. The foreman signed the verdict for the defendant 
and announced there was no need for the jury to con-
sider the case further. Protests were made by some of 
the jurors who announced they would vote differently on 
a formal ballot. Other jurors joined in the request for a 
formal ballot which the foreman refused, and the verdict 
was returned into court. The jury was then polled and 10 
of them answered that the verdict was their verdict, while 
two answered no. The court in this case assumed that 
the attitude and actions of the foreman were dictatorial, 
dogmatic, and wholly improper but Justice Tolman on 
page 246, said : 
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"We have little actual knowledge of what takes 
place within the jury room, but it is not going too 
far, we think, to say that frequently the strong char-
acters dominate the weaker ones and to open the 
door to testimony showing such practices would be 
to imperil every verdict hereafter rendered and 
make jury trials most uncertain in their results.'' 
Lastly the appellant has cited the case of Jensen vs. 
Utah Ry. Co., 72 Utah 366 at page 400; 270 Pac. 349, 362, 
attempting to show by a brief citation from this case, 
that where the committed error is of such nature or char-
acter as calculated to do harm, or on its face as having 
the natural tendency to do so, prejudice will be presumed, 
until the record is affirmatively shown that the error 
was not or could not have been of harmful effect. 
But where in the case at bar has the appellant shown 
committed error 1 
The court in the above cited case further said quoting 
from page 400 of the Utah Report : 
''The burden, of course, is on the appellant to 
show, not only error, but :prejudicial effect as well. 
But how may he .show that~ It often has been broad-
ly stated that all error:s are presumed to be prej-
udicial. We think the better rule is that not all 
committed errors in the trial of a case are presump-
tively or prima facie prejudicial, for some committed 
errors are merely abstract, or on their face imma-
terial, or otherwise are not in and of themselves cal-
culated to do harm. Still the party against whom the 
error was committed may show by the record that it 
resulted to his prejudice in some substantial right.'' 
The appellant in the case at bar certainly has not 
shown committed error or misconduct of the jury prej-
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udicial to him, and it is the (•ontention of respondent that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
grant the motion for new trial. 
POINT "D" 
Appellant by his last point D, sPeks to show that the 
last vote of the jurors was influenced by the informa-
tion sent to the jury by the judge in this case. The jury 
sent a request to the judge for further instructions while 
deliberating their Yerdict and plaintiff contends that the 
word sent back by the judge influenced the jury to such 
an extent that immediately a ballot was taken to get rid of 
the case. The judge refused to give any additional in-
struction and sent word back to the jury to read the in-
structions given and decide the case thereon. I do not 
see how plaintiff can contend that any prejudicial error 
resulted from this. If the plaintiff felt that the jury 
needed more instructions it 'vas his duty to have raised 
such issue when the verdict was returned. The :Plaintiff 
not having done so, this issue cannot be raised before the 
court at this time. 
The case of Harlan v. Taylor, decided by the Supreme 
Court of California, and reported in 33 Pacific (2nd) 
page 422, states : 
"Where jury requested additional instructions, 
but court at time was engaged in trial of another 
case and offered to comply with request as soon as 
convenient, and jury, without receiving additional 
instructions, returned verdict, plaintiff, not having 
raised point regarding additional instructions when 
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verdict was returned, held to have waived irregu-
larity, if any." 
Abbott's Trial Brief, Civil Jury Trials, Second Edi-
tion, on page 484, states: 
"But after the jury have retired, the judge is 
not bound to comply with a party's request to give 
additional instructions upon a point not covered by 
a request of the jury; nor to comply with a party's 
request to give the jury further instructions by way 
of explanation or modification of those already 
given; for it is a matter within the discretion of the 
court.'' 
And there are other numerous cases in support of this 
contention. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the plaintiff has utterly 
failed to produce or bring forth to the court any evi-
dence whatsoever that would show any errors com-
mitted by the jury in this action, prejudicial to the plain-
tiff, and that the judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. VERNON ERICKSON, 
Attorney fo'r Defendant and Respondent. 
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